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POWER, RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN CHINESE HISTORY 
Of the three words, power, rights and duties in the title of my lecture, 
the word rights is of central interest. I am concerned with how it relates 
to duties on the one hand and to power on the other at various periods of 
Chinese history. In particular, the question of whether the ancient Chinese 
only knew of duties but had no notion of rights is more than a semantic 
problem and deserves to be re-examined in the light of modern develop-
ments. This is relevant to the issue of how modern ideas of political, legal, 
civil and hwnan rights were introduced into China and how they have 
influenced China's modernisation. 
The lecture concentrates on an historical approach to the subject. By 
this I mean I do not start out with the fundamentalist position as found in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations General 
Assembly. This position is one that has developed very rapidly in the West 
during the past 200 years and the terms human rights and civil rights are 
now more potent than the earlier terms legal rights or political rights. The 
former two are evoked beyond particular communities and states to cover 
the freedom of all individuals as human beings and to justify degrees of 
international intervention unknown in the past. Obviously, the word 
rights used in this sense in the Universal Declaration would not have appeared 
in traditional societies and it would be anachronistic to try to apply it 
directly to the judgment of traditional China. It is better limited to 
judgments on China today and for that we would need to talk primarily 
about contemporary moral and political philosophy. 
Also, by an historical approach, I mean that I do not start out with the 
ideological position that rights are merely functions of social class, that 
human progress comes in successive stages and that one's rights at a later 
stage of history are superior to those at an earlier stage. This is a position 
that also came out of the West during the past 100 years and one that has 
been an inspiration to several kinds of radical nationalist, antitraditionalist 
and revolutionary movements. It has encouraged the view that the past is 
outworn and degenerate and must be replaced with a present that has a 
glorious future. The rights of classes that have been successively overthrown, 
therefore, is of no intrinsic interest and one can only condemn today the 
lack of rights for the people in traditional China. 
The fundamentalist approach has been used to judge, even condemn, 
contemporary China by both foreigners and the Chinese themselves and 
this will continue to be so used. The ideological approach is used to judge 
and condemn traditional China in order to underline revplutionary progress 
and this, too, will continue. Both approaches pertain to action and are 
invaluable for the purpose of arousing moral fervour and encouraging 
dedication to some higher social goal. This lecture does not do that. Its 
historical approach ~as chosen for the modest and contemplative purpose 
of explanation, in the belief that we are still a long way from understanding 
China and the Chinese people and that continued efforts at explanation will 
help improve our understanding, It is with that in mind that I shall be 
paying special attention to some of the earliest Chinese ideas about rights 
in relation to duties and powers. 
Let me begin, however, with a more recent, but highly relevant, event 
and also a few words about G.E. Morrison, the man we are honouring 
tonight. The event I refer to is the movement that started on May fourth, 1919. 
I am reminded that this year is the 60th anniversary of that movement by 
the hundreds of commemorative articles published in China, Taiwan and 
Hong Kong, written by people from the political left, the right as well as 
the centre.I Although there is no agreement in the articles as to why the 
movement was significant, there is general agreement that two kinds of 
political rights were brought to the fore during the course of the student 
demonstrations that spread throughout the country at that time: these were 
China's sovereign rights and democracy or popular rights; in Chinese, 
chu-ch'iian translating sovereignty and min-ch'i.ian or min-chu translating 
democracy. 
When the demonstrations took place, George Morrison was no longer in 
China and he did not live to see the results of the May Fourth Movement as 
a literary, political revolution or, as some might say, "the first cultural 
revolution" in China. But Morrison was intimately involved in the Chinese 
efforts at the Peace Conference in Paris; and it was China's failure to regain 
its sovereignty over Shantung province from Japan that started the May 
Fourth Movement on its way. My colleague, Dr Lo Hui-min who gave the 
Morrison Lecture three years ago, has published Morrison's criticisms and 
corrections of the draft of the case China was to present.2 Although they 
did not save the Chinese from defeat in the end, his concern for China's 
rights was probably no less passionate than that of the Chinese patriots of 
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the time. And although the issue of sovereign rights was uppermost in Paris, 
the idea of rights as a matter of importance for China was eventually to have 
much wider ramifications. The articles which commemorate the movement 
on its 60th birthday this year make no bones that democratic rights remain 
one of the central issues for all Chinese everywhere. 
The common character expressing rights in the words for sovereignty and 
democracy is ch'wn. This had been influenced by Japanese usage, especially 
in the word min-ch'wn for democracy (or droit civil), which was the subject 
of intense debate early in the Meiji period. During the debate, human rights 
(jen-ch 'wn) and natural rights (t'ien-fu jen-ch 'wn) were also given close 
scrutiny, but with the failure of the liberal movement in Japan in the 1880s 
this latter part of the debate did not seem to have influenced the Chinese. 
I believe that the general word for rights in the abstract, ch'wn-li, had also 
followed Japanese usage, although W.A.P. Martin's translation of Wheaton's 
Elements of International Law in 1864 had used the word about five years 
before it appeared in official use in Japanese. Significantly the word was first 
used in the context of national rights and sovereignty and this remained the 
dominant use for the next two generations.' 
In 1919, this ch'wn for rights had been fiercely debated in China for over 
20 years. The general word ch'wn-li had also come into common usage. 
Certainly, among the intelligentsia, there had been a growing consciousness 
of the idea of rights, as found in modern Western books of law, history and 
philosophy from the end of the 19th century. The idea was not always 
expressed in terms of ch'Uan-li. More specific rights were identified as 
freedom and equality, even the autonomy of the individual and the best-known 
writers who discussed these rights ranged from Yen Fu and K'ang Yu-wei to 
T'an Ssu·t'ung, Liang Ch'i·ch'ao and Sun Yat·sen; I should add, not always 
favourably nor necessarily with understanding. All the same, they and their 
contemporaries had come to recongise something new called rights for which 
there was no equivalent word in classical Chinese. Hence the acceptance of 
the term eh 'wn-li which combines the characters eh 'wn meaning power, 
influence and privilege (among other things) and Ii meaning profit and 
benefits. This was not a new combination and in early texts the word 
simply had the literal meaning of power and profit (or, in some cases, "to 
give consideration to what is profitable").4 Used in this sense, ch'Uan-li 
was often used in contrast to the Confucian ideal of /en-yi meaning 
benevolence and righteousness. In many later texts, power and profit was 
3 
simply a shorthand reference to the Legalist philosophy which Confucians 
devoted so much time to attacking.s We must keep this in mind when we 
observe the use of ch'iian-li to translate a modem political and legal concept 
of rights. Since Confucian rhetoric came to be the dominant moral, social 
and political language of discourse for most of the 2,000 years up to 1900, 
the use of the word would remind the Chinese elites of their opposition to key 
Confucian ideals. This might have made the idea of rights sound more 
radical and progressive and thus appealed to young 20th century 
activists in an atmosphere that became increasingly anti-Confucian, 
but it might also have condemned the idea to disapprobation for 
many others. 
This brings me to the concept of duties. We have just seen that there was 
certainly no word in the classical texts equivalent to rights. The interesting 
thing is that the same translators who had to use eh 'iian-li to convey the 
abstract idea of rights also could not find an accepted classical word that 
would satisfactorily translate the abstract concept of duties. The word they 
settled for wasyf.wu which combines the character yi meaning righteous 
with wu meaning essential action or task.6 It would seem to me that this 
tells us three things. If there was no general word for duties in early China, 
we should not expect one for rights but must look elsewhere for words 
which represented specific kinds of rights or at least implied the idea of 
rights. Secondly, the many words which described what seem tO have been 
specific duties have been easy to identify, but apparently not the words which 
describe or imply specific rights. And, finally, not least, the wordyi-wu 
chosen to translate duties, unlike the word ch'iian-li for rights, fits in well 
with Confucian rhetoric; in fact, the character yi which means righteousness, 
but also has as one of its meanings a particular sense of moral duty, represents 
one of the great Confucian virtues. Thus, by using yi-wu for duties, the 
modern word starts out l>Y being easily approved of by the established 
elites. But this was not necessarily an advantage. Because it was not specific 
and was used to encourage a new public-spiritedness or civic-consciousness 
not in fact familiar to traditional Chinese,' the conventional quality of yi 
probably explains why, in modern times, less attention was paid to the word 
for duties than to the more contrary and challenging word for rights. Of 
course, a simpler explanation may be that the Chinese had just had too much 
talk about duties throughout their history and not enough -about rights-. 
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One more general comment before I turn to Chinese history. The picture 
of a China in which great stress was laid on duties to the neglect of rights 
does not seem to square with our observation of other civilised societies that 
the idea of rights is something that has been articulated in response to the 
stress on duties. The more duties areemphasisedthe greater the need to 
define the rights commensurate with the duties demanded. If this was not 
so in traditional China, we would have even more reason to try and explain 
why a society which clearly underlined the importance of duties for 
thousands of years did not seem to have developed a matching concern for 
rights. But we might also have to consider on the one hand if duties and 
rights are necessarily separable concepts and on the other if China's apparent 
failure to give them equal weight had been a weakness in the development of 
its state and society. 
Not all the reformers and revolutionaries at the beginning of the 20th 
century attacked the central tenets of the Confucian state but those who did 
attacked the two specific but absolute duties expected of all Chinese, that 
of loyalty to the ruler (chung) and that of filial piety to one's parents (hsiao). 
Both ruler and father were symbols of an absolute authority which had to be 
overthrown if China were to undergo the radical reforms it so badly needed. 
The stress here must be placed on the two as symbols. Loyalty to the ruler 
was easy to attack, especially since the ruler was Manchu and the ruling 
house in obvious decay. Hence the readiness to establish a republic in 1911 
and, even more striking, the refusal to allow Yuan Shih-k'ai to restore the 
monarchy in 1915. On the other hand, loyalty itself was not attacked; the 
same degree of loyalty seems to have been demanded by the fervent 
nationalists for the stateitself. Similarly, filial piety was not attacked 
where it concerned caring for one's own family. It was attacked 
because it was absolute and thus permitted no rights to the young and the 
women in the family, because it was so demanding that all other human 
relationships had to be subordinated to it and, not least, because it was tied 
so closely to the idea of absolute loyalty to the state. 
Whatever else may be uncertain, there was no doubt that loyalty and filial 
respect were the duties par excellence in traditional China. Through legal 
codes and handbooks of family instructions, through education and indoctri-
nation, the need to be loyal and ftlial had been drummed into every child's 
head. And backing the injunctions were threats of severe punishments, in 
the name of the emperors and by the hand of the fathers themselves. 
Because the duties were expressed in such absolute terms, there seems to 
have been no room to discuss what might have been the rights of the subject 
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and of the son. As a result, a large body of modern vernacular literature and 
social thought concentrated on the evils perpetrated on the Chinese people 
by the insistence on these duties and led many to conclude that the Chinese 
simply never had the idea of rights. The image of a society in which people 
had no rights, when placed in contrast to modern Western societies in which 
both political and individual rights were openly spelt out, was probably the 
single most important reason why so many of the young students early this 
century were ready to reject the whole Confucian moral system altogether.a 
Yet there were reservations. Again and again came the plea not to throw 
out the crying baby with the dirt" bathwater. Analogies with the West were 
used to defend the Chinese tradit••'n: a sort of Confucian Protestantism 
calling for a return to the pre-imperial books was one example; similarities 
with the Renaissance revival of Greek and Latin classics was another. In 
short, there was a sustained campaign to try and depict the evils of imperial 
Confucianism as corruption and degeneration of what had been fundamentally 
sound.9 Was this true where the promotion of restrictive duties and the 
neglect of basic rights were concerned? Indeed, it may be argued that some 
ideas about rights were implicit in the two prominent duties. When sons had 
the duty to be filial, one may say that fathers had the right to expect filial 
piety. When subjects had the duty to be loyal, the ruler obriously had the 
right to expect loyalty. Then in return, sons could be said to have had the 
right to expect their fathers to do their duty and be righteous and protective 
and their mothers also to be loving and caring. Similarly, subjects had the 
right to expect their ruler to perform his duty and be benevolent, enlightened, 
righteous and to observe the proper rites. The key relationships were, of 
course, expressed in terms of specific duties, that is, specified duties from 
below to be reciprocated by specified duties from above, but this was thought 
to have been in the natural and therefore moral order of things. Granted 
that hierarchies of the ruler-subject father-son variety existed, did it matter 
much if the rhetoric used referred only to duties rather than to rights? What 
was important was that the duties were reciprocal and by being reciprocal 
implied the presence of rights. 
There are three ideas here that needed to be looked at more closely in 
Chinese history, the idea of hierarchy, the idea of reciprocity and the idea of 
implicit rights. All three are interwoven, with the idea of hierarchy the 
oldest and most significant; it may have been rooted in the ancient religion 
of the Shang dynasty in the 2nd milleniwn B.C. The Shang rulers were keenly 
6 
religious at two levels. At the public level was the worship of ti or shang-ti, 
the high god with universalist claims. At a lower level, the worship was 
private and particularist and consisted of the worship of one's own ancestors. 
Both kinds of worship were common in ancient religions, but what was 
possibly unique to China was the way the two levels of worship were closely 
associated if not actually interdependent. The Shang dynasty was succeeded 
by the Chou and the Chou rulers changed the name of the god to a less 
anthropomorphic one called t'ien (heaven), but the combined worship of 
t'ien and the ruler's ancestors continued. Some degree of reciprocity existed 
as the ruler derived benefits from his god and his ancestor, but both 
pertained only to the ruling house itself. It is still not clear how these 
hierarchical relationships involving the ruler were translated into the later 
generalised ruler-subject and father-son relationships. There were probably 
two steps needed. The first was when ancestor worship determined the son's 
relationship with his father as future ancestor. Then, the benefits of t'ien-
worship for the ruler were treated as similar to the benefits of loyalty-to-ruler 
for the subject. The point here is that the idea of above-below relationships 
was seen as a natural extension of these two and was later to justify an 
elaborate hierarchy of social and political relationships.lo 
You realise, of course, that in talking about reciprocity and reciprocal 
rights, I am talking about unequal reciprocity in a hierarchical structure. In 
short, duties and implicit rights were between unequals not between equals, 
and therefore the shares of both duties and rights were also necessarily unequal 
and this was implicit in the very concept ofreciprocity .11 These two stages 
of adapting an ancient religious faith and practice to the later secular view of 
loyalty to ruler and filial piety to father probably did not happen much 
before Confucius in the 6th century B.C. By the time Confucius spoke of 
the two relationships, it is significant that the context was political. 
Confucius was asked about government. He answered simply, "When the 
ruler is ruler and the subject is subject, when the father is father and the son 
is son, there is government" .12 The juxtaposition of both ruler-subject and 
father-son here emphasised the reciprocity which depended on both 
performing their duties but which also suggested some implicit rights. This 
question of implicit rights becomes clearer in two other quotations. 
Firstly, when he was asked how the ruler should employ his subject and 
how the subject should serve the ruler, Confucius said ''The ruler should 
employ his subject according to the rules of propriety (li); the subject should 
serve his ruler with loyalty (chung)".13 Thus the subject's rights were 
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expressed in terms of the rules of propriety due to him, and the ruler's 
rights in terms of the subject's loyalty which he could expect. At this 
point, propriety and loyalty were not simply duties; they were also 
implicitly rights in a given reciprocal relationship. Others during this period 
would say that these rights may also be found in the ruler acting benevolently 
or righteously. Another statement by Confucius is even more explicit in 
linking duties and rights causally. When he was asked how the people may 
be made to revere and be loyal to the ruler, he said, "Approach them with 
dignity, and they will respect you. Show piety towards your parents and 
kindness towards your children and they will be loyal to you".14 Here 
the relationship is direct and almost conditional: the ruler's right 
to loyalty depended on his fulfilling his own duties of being filial to his 
parents and kindly towards his people. 
Confucius was less explicit about the reciprocity in the father-son 
relationship probably because he saw the biological ties as natural and moral 
This was left to other texts, like the Book of History and the Tso Commentary 
on the Spring and Autumn Annals, where they spoke of the Five Norms. 
These seem to have referred to a set of interlocking relationships which laid 
the foundations for the most stable family system in the world; they were 
as follows: 
The father is righteous and protective; 
the mother is loving and caring; 
the elder brother is fraternal; 
the younger brother is respectful; 
and the son is filial.ls 
And Mencius in the 4th century B.C. was to spell it out even more clearly 
when he explained how an ancient sage king appointed a minister of education 
to teach the people about human relationships thus: 
Affection between father and son; righteous conduct between 
ruler and subject; distinction between husband and wife; 
proper order between the old and the young; and trust 
between friends.16 
Again, all the key words like righteous and protective, loving and caring, filial, 
and even affection, distinction, proper order and trust, seem to describe 
specific duties when taken separately, but when they are taken together as a 
hierarchy of reciprocal relationships, they also imply rights which flow from 
the duties perfonned. 
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Soon after Mencius, a keener sense of social distinctions seems to have 
arisen and thus influenced the idea of rights and duties which went along 
with such distinctions. I refer to the increasing use of the concept of fen 
(distinctions) in the 3rd century B.C., notably by Hsun Tzu, the third of the 
great Confucian philosophers, and by some of the Legalists who were 
influenced by him. Hsun Tzu said, ''The early rulers hated disorder, hence 
devised rites and righteousness to maintain the necessary distinctions, ., ______,,,-
nurture people's desires and to assure the supply of things that people ~n 
He then linked these distinctions to something like rights and duties which 
went far beyond those connected with ruler-subject father-son. Let me 
quote a part of his essay on ''The Rich Country": 
If people leave their positions and do not serve each other, 
there will be poverty; if the people are without social divisions, 
there will be strife. Poverty is an affliction, strife a calamity. 
To eliminate affiiction and avert calamity, there is no method 
so good as clarifying social distinctions, thereby causing people 
to form a social group ... 
Work is what people dislike; gain and profit is what they like. 
When duties of office and the tasks of the occupations lack clear 
distinctions, people will find it difficult to carry on their work, 
and will be beset by strife over profit and gain . . . Therefore 
wise men have introduced social distinctions.1s 
Hsun Tzu saw the need to regulate these distinctions and strongly 
advocated the application of rites (U) or the rules of proper conduct to ensure 
that rights and duties were matched along the lines of social distinctions. His 
contemporaries, some of whom were influenced by him, agreed about the 
need to regulate the distinctions but saw that he had moved away from the 
natural and moral order of things that Confucius and Mencius assumed. Hsun 
Tzu was already speaking about assigned rights and duties, assigned from 
above (by wise men, of course) and confirmed and stratified by proper 
rites and rules. It was an ominous development, for the next step followed 
easily: that the social distinctions and the rights and duties which accompanied 
them be regulated by law (fa) (that is, by rewards and punishments not by the rule 
of Jaw) and be maintained by the ruler's power (ch'iian).19 
If the idea of hierarchy was seen as no longer natural and self. 
regulatory, one would expect either a reaction against the idea itself or 
a desire for more explicit definitions of rights and duties. The 
Confucians ~efused to allow the idea to be regarded as unnatural. The 
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classic doctrine of the mandate of heaven outµrted by Mencius has often been 
taken to mean that he saw that men had a right to rebel.20 He outlined the 
view at a very high level of abstraction and assumed that the mandate was 
a self-regulating process that was set into motion when the son of heaven 
failed in his duties and stopped only when the mandate was placed into the 
hands of the next ruler. Exactly how this came about was determined by 
heaven in its own way. When rebellion against the failed ruler did occur, it 
was really thrust upon the rebels as a heavensent and therefore moral duty. 
There was thus no right to rebel. The history of the Chinese empire shows 
that no such right was ever recognised; the only justification was success 
which was all the proof needed that the natural order was self-regulating, as 
Confucian rhetoric continued to affirm. 
I have so far singled out Confucius and his disciples as bearers of tradition. 
Their impact on later Chinese history was, of course, to be enormous. But 
they were not alone in talking about hierarchical duties with implicit rights. 
Others were more sceptical about what these duties meant and what good they 
would do. As usual, in lAo Tzu. this was expressed as a paradox: the duties 
of loyalty and filial piety were not natural and only came about when 
people lost sight of the Way, that is, ''when the great Way fell into disuse". 21 
Thus, there would be loyal subjects when the state was benighted and filial 
children when the family was in disarray; in short, they were not duties for 
good times. Chuang Tzu, too, was suspicious of anything that was derived 
from superior-inferior relationships. In his delightful way, he came closest 
to breaking away from the kin-based rhetoric of rights and duties. From time 
to time, he conveyed a sense of the individual's right to free himself from 
hypocrisy and corruption.22 But this was never explicitly stated. Indeed, 
he saw no reason to, because he did not accept the Confucian view of the 
hierarchy of things as natural. He therefore said little about duties and, in 
the context of an increasingly dominant Confucian rhetoric later on, his 
ideas were not developed and made no contribution to the idea of rights. 
Both his later Taoist admirers, and the Buddhists who were far more 
influential, were contained and hemmed in by imperial concerns and the 
restrictive Confucian style of discourse on such subjects. So much so that, in 
the end, even the freedom and right to worship and to dissent which they had 
enjoyed for a few centuries were regulated by imperial officials and steadily 
circumscnbed.2 3 
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There were also other schools of thought which rejected the Confucian 
views of hierarchy. None of them, not even the Mohists (the followers of 
Mo Tzu) who spoke refreshingly of universal love, who thought there were 
gods and spirits superior to one's ancestors and who even hinted at a right 
to material benefits, or bluntly, to profit (a very on-Confucian idea}, not even 
they could challenge the Confucian hold on the imperial government.24 And 
failing that, all schools of thought and the ideas they might have developed 
became increasingly subordinated to the demands and needs of that 
government. 
We come once again to imperial government. My excursion to an earlier 
period was to see if the defenders of the glorious Chinese tradition in the 
20th century were right, that the fundamental ideas they needed were all 
there in the ancient past, that they had been obscured or trampled upon by 
the brutal masters of the empire for 2,000 years. What was now needed, to 
use the earlier metaphor, was to wipe the baby clean and let him grow. I 
believe it is understandable why the defenders looked so fondly at the 
ancients, and not merely for nostalgic, psychological or chauvinistic reasons. 
The pre-imperial centuries were illuminated by brilliant thinkers with varied 
and potentially fertile ideas; the imperial period, despite the great influence 
of Buddhism coming from outside and transforming the intellectual and 
religious scene, was narrowing and inhibiting. It was tragic that the Confucians, 
who had been part of a liberating and stimulating force earlier on, came to 
symbolise the imperial i:-egime. It was doubly tragic because, in supporting 
that regime, they had allowed their moral and dignified rhetoric to be abused 
by a self-seeking despotic system. 
How did this affect the question of rights and duties? I have already 
suggested that Hsun Tzu had influenced the Legalists on this point. The 
Book of Lord Shang (largely a 3rd century B.C. work) actually had a 
chapter on the fixing of standards{ that is, rights and duties according to 
social distinctions). It also says in another place, "If law is established, 
rights and duties are made clear and self-interest does not hann the law, then 
there is orderly government".25 This idea oflaw, of course, had nothing to 
do with the rule of law and did not, therefore, lead to the development of 
anything comparable to the modern understanding of legal rights. Although 
there were hints that everyone was subject to the same laws laid down by the 
ruler, the stress laid on the ruler rather than on the law was crucial. Indeed, 
these laws must be seen in the context of a manipulative court, of severe 
punishments and of the cynical use of terror, all of which were necessary 
11 
in the eyes of Han Fei Tzu, the leading Legalist philosopher (of the 3rd 
century B.C.). They were necessary in order to bring about unity and 
stability and ultimately the kind of state whose ruler "does nothing and yet 
accomplishes everything".26 Thus, the Legalists' only contribution to the 
idea of rights was a mockery and could not be further from that of legal 
rights. This was their totally new concept of the ruler's right to absolute 
power. The right was not some divine right, nor Mencius' mandate of heaven. 
This right was independent and quite distinct from the kinds of implicit 
rights embodied in reciprocal duties that were already traditional by that 
time. There were, in fact, no duties essential to this right except the duty to 
preserve the ruler's absolute power. The laws, primarily rules governing 
rewards and punishments, were the instruments to this end. 
There still was no word for rights, simply various words for power and 
authority explicitly stated as belonging to the successful ruler. And here is 
where the word power in the title of this lecture comes in. I am speaking of 
a power that was supported by laws and by administrative skills as well as 
by armed strength. The word for this power used in The Book of Lord Sha~ 
was eh 'iian, a word derived from the use of measures and standards, but 
extended to mean power and authority as well as the right to that power. 
This brings us back to where we began, to the key modem word used to 
translate rights as in sovereign, monarchical, popular, civic and human rights, 
the same word ch'iian It is a most versatile word and power was obviously 
only one of its meanings. To use eh 'iian for rights reveals a particular 
attitude towards the idea of rights which is contrary to Western usage. As I 
understand it, most of the uses of the word "rights" in the West have the 
connotation of something absolute and universal derived from the phrase 
"natural rights". This connotation is missing in the word eh'iian The power 
and authority it stands for has to be grasped; it is the handle or lever which, 
when used effectively, gives its user the right to act. When the Legalists 
used eh'iian as (to quote one of them) "the standards fixed by the ruler 
alone'',27 the word served as the basis for the ruler's right to total power. 
We may ask, what have the Legalists to do with the 20th century? They 
had been responsible for the unification of China but also for producing the 
first great tyrant, for burning books and murdering the intelligentsia; for the 
latter, they have been officially condemned for 2 ,OOO years. Of course, 
several ideas and institutions, including the ruler's right to absolute power, 
survived into the following Han dynasty and remained key parts of the 
imperial system thereafter. But it was Confucianism that became the state 
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ideology, and it recreated the elaborate hierarchy of status and office that 
Confucians thought was characteristic of the ideal Chou government. This 
hierarchy was not decorative or simply a sop to human vanity. It was 
regarded as natural to man and essential to social harmony and it was properly 
regulated by the use of Ii (rites). And, from the point of view of rights and 
duties, the Confucians restored to this hierarchy the idea of reciprocal duties 
with implicit rights which interlocked all levels from top to bottom. And 
in so far as these duties were expressed through rites and ceremonies which 
tied the ruler to his ministers, they could act as something of a check on the 
ruler's right to absolute power.n 
But the legacy of the right to absolute power remained strong. Although 
not directly acknowledged by the Confucians, who simply would not have 
used words like ch'iian to describe this right, it reappeared eventually under 
a Confucian cloak through the use of the word chung for a subject's absolute 
loyalty to which the ruler had a right. And by combining this loyalty with 
filial piety and raising them both above all other moral qualities and duties, 
later Confucians had surrendered a key tenet in Confucius' philosophy. For 
Confucius had stressed the reciprocal nature of both loyalty and fiJ.ial piety 
and even suggested that loyalty to the ruler was conditional on the ruler 
himself acting properly, by being himself filial and kind. But, of course, 
Confucius was reported to have said many other things besides. He had 
juxtaposed the two relationships of ruler-subject and father-son and also 
suggested another causal link between loyalty and filial piety. For example, 
the famous quotation from Yu Tzu approved by Confucius confirmed the 
link: "Few who are filial and fraternal would want to offend their superiors; 
and when they do not like to off end their superiors, none would be fond of 
stirring up disorder".29 From this, it was easy to argue that filial sons tend to 
make loyal subjects and that an orderly empire should pay special attention 
to filial piety to ensure that the people behave loyally. By the end of the 
Han dynasty, the Classic of Filial Piety attributed to Confucius had come to 
be regarded as the classic that brought together the primary source of 
wisdom. And the Classic linked loyalty directly to filial piety and could say, 
in relation to the 3,000 crimes subject to Five Punishments of ancient times, 
that no crime was greater than that of being unfilial.30 
This was but the beginning. A few centuries later, the law would permit 
parents to kill a disobedient and disrespectful son as the ruler might execute 
rebellious subjects and the master a slave who resisted punishment.3t The 
duties of ftlial piety and loyalty thus became no longer reciprocal and 
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rights no longer implicit. In practice, it was tantamount to saying that these 
duties were absolute and unconditional. The more often the two duties 
were causally linked, the more the ruler could demand not only loyalty 
from his subjects but also that all fathers produced filial sons who were then 
likely to be loyal subjects. In this way, whatever autonomy the family might 
have had was eroded and a major safeguard against the ruler's absolute 
power was eventually removed. In the end, the Classic of Filial Piety received 
the personal endorsement of T'ang emperors and. by the Sung dynasty, it 
was given a companiqn Classic of Loyalty (attnbuted to the Han dynasty). 
The two duties had become so absolute that it could be asserted that "even if 
the ruler does not act like a ruler, the subject may not but act like a subject; 
even if the father does not act like a father, the son may not but act like a 
son"3:Z - something completely contrary to the spirit of Confucius and the 
values of true Confucians. 
The picture of a civilisation where all those below - the great 
majority - had only duties, and the only rights were found among the 
small minority who held power above, emerged gradually as a form of 
despotism over several centuries. It would, however, be true to say that the 
conditions for despotic rule worsened fairly steadily from the Han to the 
T'ang and more rapidly after the T'ang, with despotism reaching new heights 
during the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties. But, although this story had been told 
many times, there is no agreed explanation as to why this had happened. It 
is interesting how many scholars would say that it had never been that bad, 
because China continued to produce fine literature, beautiful art, subtle 
and sophisticated philosophy right through those centuries. Some would add 
economic and technological innovations to that list. Others would also 
point to the ultimate check on despotism: the rebellions of the politically 
inert peasant masses. But there was no impact here on the articulation of 
rights, for the rebels who succeeded only replaced one despotic house with 
another. It never seemed to have occurred to any Chinese ruler that the 
system could be changed or that he could rule without having to be a despot 
himself. Indeed, so many of the Confucian literati were willing to serve 
the new house that it is no wonder that the question never arose. 
Yet others would note how some of the Confucian literati themselves had 
become conscious of the great abuses of power at the expense of their own 
status and privileges. There were indeed men who deplored the arbitrariness 
that had crept into the system and wrote critically about what had to be 
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done. I shall give only two examples of political innovation here. The first, 
in the 11 th century; occurred when the refonner Wang An-shih brought acri-
monious debate on policies and issues into the court. Instead of leading to the 
emergence of something like a goverrunent with a loyal opposition, the debate 
led to a general condemnation of the evils of factionalism. Factions fought 
for the emperor's ear and, when the emperors were changed, the defeated 
factions were thoroughly purged. Factions could not become legitimate 
parties, and no rights were gained in the ensuing decision to condemn as 
factionalism any kind of sharing and grouping of political views. The other 
example comes from imperial policy about religious heterodoxy. After the 
taming of the Buddhists during the T'ang dynasty, especially after the 
persecutions of the 9th century, the imperial goverrunent no longer tolerated 
any effort to organise dissent against the doctrines and policies of the empire. 
The Confucian literati had a hand in this because they saw themselves as the 
protectors of the state orthodoxy and they condoned the harsh punishments 
drawn up against any group that organised itself in ways that were not 
approved. Eventually, they themselves became the victims, especially during 
the Ming dynasty, when the court fell into the hands of eunuchs and court 
favourites. For when at the beginning of the 17th century the literati 
tried to check the abuses of power, they found that they had no right to 
organise themselves to do so. Their feeble efforts were declared to have 
been examples of factionalism and nothing came of them. This failure, and 
the fall of the dynasty soon after, did lead to some re-thinking about the 
dangers of absolutist power. The new ideas were futile, too feeble and too 
late.33 Also, ironically, the Manchu conquest of China was brutal but 
successful. It brought more than a century of unity, stability and relative 
peace and was probably the most glorious period of absolutism in Chinese 
history. 
Why traditional China became increasingly despotic is a major historical 
question which will engage us for generations to come, and my outline here 
of the growing stress on duties, and the total dependence on power for anyone 
to have rights at all, is not an attempt to deal with that larger issue. What it 
does help us understand is why the Chinese defenders of the tradition in the 
20th century who turned to the remote past to find ways to save China 
failed and why those who openly rejected the tradition came eventually to 
succeed. I shall use the time remaining to me to consider how this develop-
men t affected the subject of rights and duties. I need hardly say that I will 
have to do this with a very broad and sweeping brush. 
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First, let me remind you of the point I made earlier about the use of the 
word ch'iian to translate rights, especially its connotation of power that had 
to be seized and which was far from the idea of "natural rights" . At the end 
of the 19th century, there were two major strands of thought about rights. 
There were those like K'ang Yu-wei, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao among the reformers 
in 1898 and Sun Yat-sen and Chang Ping-tin among the revolutionaries 
before 1911 who were primarily concerned with China's power to recover its I 
sovereign rights and there were many conservative mandarins of the Ch'ing ) 
court who shared that concern in their own way.34 There were others, more 
philosophically inclined, like Yen Fu and T'an Ssu-t'ung, who understood 
something about the importance of individual rights but saw them ultimately 
in terms of their contribution towards strengthening China. Yen Fu, in 
particular, admired the energy that individualism could generate and wanted 
to see it harnessed towards collective ends. 35 In other words, for both groups, 
rights represented the kind of power and energy China needed. And because 
of this, it was easy to see such rights not as universal principles, but as 
instruments, as means to a higher end, this end being the revival of 
China. 
For both these groups, it was easy to translate imperial or monarchical 
rights into modern terms: there were British and German examples to 
compare with and even better, the Japanese model But the idea of 
democratic rights as represented by the republics of France and the United 
States was more difficult; here the key words were freedom and equality. 
It is doubtful if any Chinese leader at the time ever understood the deep 
roots these words had in the legal and political institutions of the West. Of 
course, this is understandable, not only because the words had different 
meanil1gs and connotations for the Chinese, but also because they did 
mean different things at different times in the different countries 
of the West itself. I need only mention a few examples of how 
some Chinese understood individual freedom. I have already ref erred to 
Yen Fu's idea that this freedom released new energy for the greater wealth 
and strength of the nation. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, on the other hand started with 
enthusiasm for rights and liberties for the Chinese people, but the more he 
learnt about their implications for the group, for the collective idea of ch'iian, 
the more uneasy he became about the dangers they would bring to China.36 I 
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As for Sun Yat-sen, who had a far more authoritarian personality than 
either Yen Fu or Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, he was quite blunt in claiming that the 
Chinese people already had liberty, so much liberty that they did not need 
a word for it. Here I must pause to comment on how confusing this claim 
sounds. It may be compared with that commonly made observation about 
how individualistic the Chinese people appear to be. Obviously we need to 
know the context of such statements. Sun Yat-sen was talking about people's 
rights (min-ch'iian) and not about personal or civil liberties. His reference to 
liberty described the numerous rival families and local organisations that 
would never unite and, when not firmly controlled, tended towards 
anarchy. Similarly, Chinese are individualistic in action and behaviour with 
the confidence that they are fully supported by their families, but that 
would have nothing to do with individual rights. Thus Sun Yat-sen went on 
to say, China was like a tray of loose sand and what was desperately needed 
was the cement that would bring it unity and national liberation.37 It is 
significant how this vivid image of a tray of loose sand came quickly to 
dominate most Chinese thinking during the first half of this century. 
All these men, and there were hundreds of others of this first generation, 
spoke of rights and liberties very much in tenns of what would best serve 
collective goals. Collective rights were obviously quite different from 
individual rights, but they were not merely those of the state but would 
include those of the scholar literati and other social groups as well as those 
of merchant guilds, local organisations and extended families. By stressing 
the collective, it simply meant that the rights of the individual were never 
autonomous but always subordinated to the rights of the group he belonged 
to. On the other hand, the individual had the right to exercise the rights of his 
group. In the use of ch'iian in min-ch'iian (people's rights), this generation 
of writers gave emphasis to the political power due to the people, their share 
in detennining the destiny of China, their role, in fact, in saving China. Thus, 
although they used min-ch'iian to translate democracy, there was little 
hint of civil liberties in the word that would link people's rights with the 
idea of natural or legal rights so prominent in Western usage.3B 
What of the second generation? This year being the 60th anniversary of 
the widely remembered May Fourth Movement I mentioned earlier in the 
lecture, it is appropriate to call it the May Fourth generation, whether it 
remained in China or ended eventually in Taiwan, Hong Kong or North 
America. The generation includes, among others, those who played a role 
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in launching the movement and those who became part of it and were greatly 
influenced by it. Of the former, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li Ta-chao, Hu Shih and Lu 
Hsun are the best known. Of the latter, there were writers, scholars, politicians 
and journalists of every colour and most of them left a mark in the history of 
the three decades before the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949. 
Men like Mao Tsetung, Chou Enlai and Kuo Mojo, perhaps the most powerful 
and influential of them, stayed long on the stage and have only recently died. The 
generation was a very varied one and represented several different political 
and intellectual strands. Some of them also had starkly different fates, the 
most striking being those of Hu Shih, the liberal follower of the American 
philosopher John Dewey, and Lu Hsun, the fierce critic of tradition and 
every kind of humbug: the first is reviled and the second is worshipped in 
China today.39 But most of them started with one basic cause in common: 
they were prepared to contemplate the rejection of the ancient Confucian 
tradition. The difficulty, however, was that they could not agree what to 
replace it with. 
Where rights and duties were concerned, there were many voices raised 
on behalf of individual rights, women's rights, political rights, legal rights, 
even something akin to what we would call today basic human rights. But 
what became clear was that voices however loud, proclamations however bold 
and goodwill however widespread were not enough. What was needed was 
the power to clean away the corruption and anarchy and bring China back 
to unity and stability. It had been clearly recognised that, without that unity 
and order, all else would come to nought. With the militarists ruling over 
different parts of China, it became widely agreed that power had to come 
from military victory. Indeed, the unity of China had always come from 
superior armed force and no Chinese leader could avoid that heritage. Finer 
issues of rights and duties would simply have to wait. 
When the militarists were overthrown in 1927 and the Kuomintang 
established its one-party government in Nanking, the waiting for rights was 
couched in terms of political tutelage, not people's rights but party cadres 
teaching the people to know their rights. The new government asked for 
six years in which to do this. During these years, a fierce debate went on about the 
relative merits of democracy and dictatorship. This is not the place to enter 
into that debate. It is enough to say that the debate brought out grave doubts 
about liberal democracy. Some called for the return to the familiar traditional 
duties: the self-improving discipline that would make one truly filial and 
therefore ready to give absolute loyalty to the ruler and the state. Others 
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simply admitted their admiration for Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin and several 
organisations were founded to give support to Chiang Kai-shek as the Supreme 
Leader. Western-educated intellectuals, too, had begun to admire dictators, and 
the following was a commonly expressed view in the 1930s: "China's current 
situation absolutely does not allow us time for old-fashioned Western thought. 
We should immediately abandon superstitions about democracy . . . We need 
a government with centralised powers that can produce the best talent that 
is efficient and competent".40 Little progress was made in the realm of 
political rights but there was progress with legal rights in the new courts and 
the small legal profession. Equal rights for women, particularly with regard 
to inheritance, was a notable step forward. All the same, the progress has 
to be placed in the context of a philosophy that rejected any legal system 
which stressed individual freedom in favour of one whose basic units were 
the extended family (chia-tsu) and the social organisation (t'ua~t'z). Hu 
Han-min went even further to say that the laws erected upon [Sun Yat-sen's] 
Three Principles of the People are quite different from the legal systems of 
Europe· and America because they recognise that, during a national revolution, 
the basic unit must be the society as an organic whole.41 The ch'iian or rights 
of the state, therefore, came before the ch'iian of its component parts. 
This was also the context in which the Chinese Communist Party was 
founded. The CCP leaders saw the force of this eh 'uan of the state that was 
so pervasive in China. What they had to do was to transfom1 the ch'iian 
from that of the state to that of the class, "the class of the labouring 
masses". For an intermediate period, the United Front strategy permitted 
the inclusion of some friendly members of the bourgeois and rich peasant 
classes. But the hostile ruling elites were identified with foreign imperialists 
as "enemies of the people".42 Therefore, the people's duty was clear, 
destroy the elites who betrayed the people and, in order to do this, the party 
would seize power in the name of the rights of the working classes. 
The CCP was led by those of the May Fourth generation who had turned 
to Marxism-Leninism for the best solution to China's problems. They 
wanted to replace their heritage with the best available from the West and 
they saw Marxism-Leninism as the most advanced and scientific body 
of ideas around. Their model, therefore, was the Soviet Union, including its 
legal and political organisations, and most notably the Stalinist party 
organisation which was being moulded into shape in the 1930s. 
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It is probably no coincidence that, on the surface, both the ideology 
and the model fitted in well with the Chinese predilection for collective 
concerns which I have argued above. For although the May Fourth generation 
rejected the traditional system and wished to remove the kind of traditional 
power that favoured duties over rights, it is interesting that they did not 
reject the traditional idea of reciprocity, nor did they reject the stress on 
centralised power. For example, when the CCP came to power m 1949, the 
idea of duties from above being reciprocated by duties from below seems to 
have taken the form of party cadres adopting the slogan of .. Serve the 
People':4 3 while the masses in tum performed their duties on behalf of 
their socialist state. The crux of the problem was whether the cadres were 
above (acting like traditional bureaucrats or officials}, and the masses were 
below (comparable to the traditional peasants}. Similarly, centralised power 
was not supposed to be held by bureaucrats but to be in the hands of the all-powerful 
party as the vanguard of the proletariat. Such a party exercised that power through 
networks of rights and duties, one of the most notable of which was 
expressed through the Mass Line which is summed up in the phrase "from 
the people, to the people".44 The strict ideological position was that there 
was no above and no below and that the duties were not simply duties but 
were reciprocal duties accompanied and balanced by reciprocal rights. As 
for the power, it was not to be the old kind of power monopolised by 
selfish interests and an elite class, but a new kind of people's power which, 
where rights and duties were concerned, may be used to keep the reciprocal 
rights and duties in balance. And there was a constitution and various 
judicial and supervisory organs to keep everything under tight control. 
Where the new dispensation gave equal weight to rights as to duties, this was 
clearly a conscious effort to improve on the traditional neglect of rights. 
But what is clear is that these are class rights, or group rights that may 
generally be described as collective rights, and not individual rights. 45 
China in the 1950s no longer wanted to imitate the West of Western 
Europe and North America; its model was the Soviet Union. But all was 
not well with that model and, by the end of the decade, Mao Tsetung was 
looking for what he thought would be a more genuinely Marxist-Leninist 
way for China. Since the West was still taboo and China's own traditions 
were outmoded, it really was far from clear how Mao Tsetung was going to 
make his leap into the revolutionary unknown. What seems clear is that he 
was genuinely afraid that his own generation of cadres was about to lose its 
20 
revolutionary ideals and act like bureaucrats from above when dealing with 
the masses below.4 6 This he thought would have been a step backwards, 
especially if power thereafter resided in a new ruling class which was similar 
to a Soviet-type technocracy. On this subject, he was opposed by most of 
his senior party colleagues who did not share his zeal for revolutionary 
purity at the cost of unity and stability. 
I do not know how Mao Tsetung worked this out in his own mind. What 
was astonishing is how he was able to act above and outside of his party 
and the law. He seems to have gone beyond the settled triangle of power, 
rights and duties to exert his personal authority on behalf of some new and 
undefined rights, the rights of the young, of the third generation, the 
uncorrupted children of the People's Republic. Indeed, the way he 
launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966 was a remarkable 
innovation.4 ' He seems to have wanted the young to revive the revolution 
and keep his vision alive and, if possible, to define their right to check the 
power of their elders. But his plan was probably an impossible one. His 
colleagues in the armed forces were divided and the majority was unmoved. 
The party was wounded but the senior leaders managed to hold firm. The 
government and the country as a whole staggered about on the brink of 
anarchy and that was unacceptable even to Mao Tsetung himself. And, 
not least, the youl\g generation knew not what they were supposed to do 
and became victims of the power struggle that ensued at the top. Thus, in 
the end, not only were no new rights defined, even the sacred collective 
rights of the working classes guaranteed by law were severely undermined. 
Ironically, Mao Tsetung's discovery of his absolute authority and his 
willingness to use it and allow it to be used and abused created a situation 
where he was himself to become the sole object of both loyalty and filial 
piety in a very traditional sort ofway.4 ' The net result was that, for some 
ten years from 1966 to 1976, everyone had duties but few had rights and 
all power, absolute power, was lodged in one man. 
The attempt to define new rights enabling the young to check the power of 
their elders has failed and Mao Tsetung's senior colleagues who survived are deter-
mined never to allow such an attempt to be made again, at least not in the same 
way. The present policy seems to be to return to the pre-Cultural Revolution 
ways (in some cases, further back another decade to the mid-1950s). Where 
rights and duties are concerned, this may be described as restoring the 
balance between rights and duties by paying more attention to legal rights 
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and re-examining the issues of political rights. But there is no noticeable 
change of policy towards the idea of individual rights, which is still seen as 
being based on "bourgeois and capitalist" values. The most recent statements 
on this subject quote Marx's comments in Das Kapital on the innate rights 
of man being best exemplified in the sale and purchase of labour-power 
where he explained, echoing Jeremy Bentham. how freedom, equality, 
property "all work together to their mutual advantage, for the common 
weal and in the common interest". But after the transaction, he adds, the 
money-owner now smirks self-importantly as the capitalist while the man 
who brought his own hide to market can now only expect a tanning!49 
Therefore, the recent articles quote with approval Marx's famous definition 
in his essay "On the Jewish Question", "that the so-called rights of man 
are quite simply the rights of the member of the civil society, that is, of 
egoistic man, of man separated from other men and from the community".so 
What Marx believed in was the citizen, the moral person, whose rights would 
harmonise with those of the community. In this spirit, the rights that have 
been restored in China since 1977 are understandably defined in terms of 
collective and therefore moral interests. 
But the circumstances have changed. As with all others in history, 
restorations never restore fully. The question is whether the restoration may 
now take two steps forward or whether China may go the Stalinist way again 
and become more like the Soviet Union. I would suggest that there are at 
least three developments which may be described as post-Cultural Revolution 
and which promise interesting changes to the question of rights. The first 
concerns the activists of the third generation, the children of the People's 
Republic. Although Mao Tsetung failed to give them power and responsi-
bility, he succeeded in raising their political awareness and in involving 
some of them for a while in practical politics at different levels. They are 
a sadder generation now but they have seen what can go wrong with a system 
that could not guarantee legal protection against abuses of authority. They 
are among the ones who are writing about legal and political rights today and 
they would never be content to become the inert masses again. The second 
concerns the release of energies which seem to be encouraged by the present 
Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing, something observers have compared to "the 
spontaneous urge to capitalism" of the Chinese people everywhere. There is 
much new initiative and enterprise now. It may not be long before China 
acknowledges Yen Fu's perceptive comment on individualism at the turn of 
the century: if individualism were encouraged and individual rights protected, 
great energies would be released to serve collective ends. 
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And the third development follows from the first and the second. 
Collective ends and interests take many forms and all Chinese who had been 
through the Cultural Revolution, the present leaders as well as the young 
activist generation, would have learnt that China needs strong legal pro-
tection for all sizes of collectives. The absolute power of Mao Tsetung as 
the Great Leader and the ultimate collective, the State, were terrifying 
without adequate checks. The checks were supposed to lie in the wide range 
of collectives spread around the country. But every Chinese experienced the 
power of the state and its leader when they interfered in the rights of all 
these collectives, so much so that none of the larger collectives were able to 
protect the smaller ones within them, and the small collectives, of course, 
lost their right to protect their own individual members. Thus the present 
policy of restoring rights to collective units does not refer only to the larger 
ones of class, party, army, government and commune, but also to the 
smallest institutions, factories, production teams, even families. The question 
is, after the traumatic experience of 1966-1976, will the new rights be quali-
tatively different? Will there be stronger safeguards? If indeed full rights 
are restored and guaranteed, there may be no need to labour the point about 
individual rights. A hierarchy of collective rights which protects the rights 
of each of its smallest units may not be as dramatic or as challenging as the 
ideal of the legal right of the individual versus the State that some cultures 
prize. But it does seem to be in harmony with a society such as China 
that is deeply committed to the moral and social value of reciprocal rights 
and duties. 
Logically speaking, the ideal position may be one in which individual 
and collective rights and duties are so balanced that they are self-regulatory. 
But then history is not logical. At any point of history, each society has a 
specific pattern of rights and duties and faces decisions about the next step 
it should take: it could give more weight to rights or more to duties or just 
stay the way it was. What makes it possible for the society to take the next 
step is what I would call power.51 In Chinese history, this power had been 
exercised over some twenty centuries against rights of all kinds in favour of 
duties. For the past 60 years, modem Chinese have tried to use new power 
to guarantee a balance of duties and rights. They have not yet succeeded 
but they may now know the way. 
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9 The defenders of the Confucian tradition of the 1920s and 1930s have not 
had as much attention as the attackers during the past three decades, but 
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Charlotte Furth (ed.) The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservative 
Alternatives in Republican China, Cambridge, Mass. 1976; Thomas A. 
Metzger, Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China's 
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Tso chuan, Chao Kung 7 (in Shih-son ching chu-shu, Taipei reprint 1955, 
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19 The best concise account of this next step as represented by the I.egalists 
(or Realists) is still ArthurWaley's Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China, 
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1973, chap. III "Political Life'', pp. 100-124. 
26 
24 Mo Tzu discussed the idea of Ii, benefit or profit, extensively. The link 
between this Ii and universal love (chien-ai) is specially illwninating; see 
the three essays on universal love, Mo Tzu hsien-ku, Chu-tzu chi-ch'eng 
edition, Peking 1954, vol. 4, pp. 62-80. Fung Yu-Ian gives particular stress 
to this under the heading of "utilitarianism", see D. Boddes' translation, 
A Hi3tory of Chinese Philosophy, Peiping 1937, pp. 84-91. 
2s Shang chiin shu, "Hsiu-ch'uan", p. 24; I follow Duyvendak's translation, 
p. 260. 
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the meaning of his essay "Chu tao" in Han Fei Tzu chi-shih, Peking 1958, -
vol. l,pp.67-69. See B. Watson's translation, Han Fei Tzu: Basic Writings. 
New York 1964, pp. 16-20. 
21 Shang chi.in shu, p. 24; Duyvendak, p. 260. For the full range of 
meanings of the word, see Shuo-wen chieh-tzu ku-lin, Taipei reprint 1959, 
vol. V, 2427a-2428a, and Morohashi Tetsuji, Dai Kanwa jiten, vol. VI, pp. 
6317-6322. 
2a Thus it has been argued that the Chinese emperor has never had absolute 
powers; see the fine statement of this position in John C.H. Wu, "Chinese 
le8111 and political philosophy", in Charles A. Moore (ed.), The Chinese Mind, 
Honolulu 1967, pp. 219-226. 
29 Lun Yii,"Hsueh er", p. 5; cf. Legge, p. 138. 
3o Hsiao Ching,"Wu hsing" (in Shih-san ching chu-shu, Taipei reprint 1955, 
vol 13),pp.42-43; for a broader interpretation of what was not filial, see 
Liu Hsuan, Hsiao Ching shu-yi, ms. version in Hayashi Hideichi, ~kyo 
jutsugifukugen ni kansuru kenkyu, Tokyo 1953, pp. 151-152. 
31 Nilda Noboru, Shina mibunho shi, Tokyo 1942, p. 814, pp. 820ff. 
32 Words attributed to the Han scholar, K'ung An-kuo, in the preface he was 
supposed to have written for Hsiao Ching, in Yen K'o-chun, Ch'uan Shang-ku 
San-tai Ch'in-Han San-Kuo Liu-ch'ao wen, Peking 1958 reprint, pp. 196-197. 
The controversy as to whether this was forged by Wang Su (3rd century A.D.) 
or Liu Hsuan (7th century) or by some unknown Sung scholar whose work 
was brought to Japan in the 13th century is too complex to go into here. The 
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be seen in the forging of the Classic of Loyalty; Chang Hsin-ch'eng, 
Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, Shanghai 1954 reprint, vol. I, pp. 418-435, vol. II, 
pp. 640-641. 
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33 The most famous example of this rethinking is Huang Tsung-hsi,Ming-yi 
tai-fang lu (Ssu-pu pei-yao edition, la-2a), essays on "Yuan Chun" and "Yuan 
Ch'eng"; see W.T. de Bary, "Chinese Despotism and the Confucian Ideal" 
in J.K. Fairbank (ed.) Chinese Thought and Institutions, Chicago 1957, 
pp. 165-176. For the ideas of the Tung-Un "Party", the most thorough study 
in English is Heinrich Busch, "The Tung-Un shu-yuan and its political and 
philosophical significance'',Monumenta Serial, XN (1955), pp. 1-163. 
34 The best example is Chang Chih-tung who favoured the spirited defence of 
sovereign rights but totally rejected the idea of democratic rights; Ch'iian-
hsiieh p'ien, "Cheng-ch'uan", in Chang wen-hsiang kung ch'iian-chi, Taipei 1963, 
pp. 3715-3716; See also Ho Ch'i's reply, Ch'iian-hsUehp'ien shu-lou in Huang 
Ch'ao H9".-ai wen-pien, vol.VII, esp. pp. 713-744. 
35 See Benja,min Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the 
West, Cambridge, Mass. 1964, pp.54 ff. 
36 Liang Ch'i-ch'ao,HsinMin Shuo in Yin-p~·shih wen-chi, .. Lun tzu-yu", 
vol. I, pp. 37-46; and his essay, "Kuo-chia ssu-hsiang pien-ch'ien yi-t'ung 
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Hiroyuki, the Meiji scholar who debated the problem of natural rights 
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Seattle 1972, pp. 56-61. 
37 Sun Yat-sen, San-min chu-yi in Kuo-ju ch'iian-shu, Taipei 1960, pp. 224-225. 
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strong; Yang Hung-lieh, Chung-kuo fa-Iii ssu-hsiang shih, Shanghai 1936, 
pp. 305-335. 
3' For Hu Shih's liberal ideas on "human rights", see his fust essay in Jen-
ch'ilan lun-chi, Shanghai 1930, pp. 1-12. Mao Tsetung was only partly 
responsible for the sharp difference in response towards the two men since 
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Mao Tsetung Hsuan chi (one-volume edition), Peking 1964, p. 691. Hu Shih 
was attacked in the 1950s as the symbol of bourgeois liberalism and is still 
so attacked even after Mao Tsetung's death; see the recent essay by Keng 
Yun-chih, "Hu Shih yii wu-ssu shih-ch'i ti hsin wen-hua yun-tung", in 
Lishiyanjiu, no. 5, 1~79, pp. 59-79. 
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Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937, Cambridge, Mass. 1974, p. 148. The writer of 
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of Wu Ching-hsiung (John C.H. Wu), one of the most enlightened jurists of 
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the individual. Now we, in struggling for freedom, start from the group 
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41 Hu Han-min, quoted in Yang Hung-Iieh, pp. 347-350. 
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criminals and also human and property rights in Patricia E. Griffin, The 
Chinese Communist Treatment of Counterrevolutionaries 1924-1949, 
Princeton 1976, Appendices. 
43 Mao Tsetung, ·~ the- People", Selected Works, London 1956, vol. N, 
pp. 219-220. 
4 4 Mao Tsetung, "On methods ofleadership", Selected Works, vol. N, pp. 111-117. 
45 All Chinese constitutions since the 1920s guarantee a wide range of civil 
liberties; cf. the formally promulgated constitutions of 1923, 1946, 1954, 
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Government and Politics of China, Cambridge, Mass. 1950, Appendix C & D; 
1954 constitution published Peking 1954;Peking Review 24 January 1975 and 17 
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46 Mao Tsetung,''Chairman Mao discusses twenty manifestations of 
bureaucracy", quoted in D. Milton, N. Milton and F. Schunnann (eds), 
People's China, Harmondsworth 1977, pp. 246-250. The more modern and 
technocratic the bureaucracy, of course, the harder it is to check their 
abuses. 
47 Of the many documents relevant to this, none suggests this point more 
succinctly than his "Bombard the Headquarters" (5 August 1966),Peking 
Review, 33 (11 August 1967). 
4 8 There is now a vast literature on this, but the point was well summed up at 
T'ien-an men on 5 April 1976 thus, "China is no longer the China of yore, 
and the people are no longer wrapped up in sheer ignorance; gone for good 
is Chin Shih-hull!18's feudal society", quoted in Peking Review, 15 
(9 April 197.6). 
49 Karl Marx, Capital, vol. I, Harmondsworth, 1976, p. 280. This has been 
quoted, for example, in Hsiao Wei-yun, et al. "Ma-k'o-ssu chu-yi chen-yang 
k'an 'jen-ch'iian' wen-t'i" in Hongqi, 5 (1979), p. 45 •. 
50 Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question", Early Writings, Harmondsworth 
1975, pp. 229, 234. 
51 Power is double edged. Compare Hitler's "There are no rights without 
protection by power" (quoted inEncounter, May 1979, p. 97, inscribed in 
his hand on the 192 7 first edition of vol. II of Mein Kampf) with the fine 
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can float a ship; it can also sink it", originally quoted in Hs"n Tzu, "Wang 
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The George Ernest Morrison 
Lecture in Ethnology 
The George Ernest Morrison Lecture was founded by Chinese residents in 
Australia and others in honour of the late Dr G.E. Morrison, a native of 
Geelong, Victoria, Australia. 
The objects of the foundation of the lectureship were to honour for all 
time the memory of a great Australian who rendered valuable services to 
China, and to improve cultural relations between China and Australia. The 
foundation of the lectureship had the official support of the Chinese Con-
sulate-General, and was due in particular to the efforts of Mr William Liu, 
merchant, of Sydney; Mr William Ah Ket, barrister, of Melbourne; Mr 
F.1. Quinlan and Sir Colin MacKenzie, of Canberra, From the time of its 
inception until 1948 the lecture was &Ssodated with the Australian Institute 
of Anatomy, but in the latter year the responsibility for the management of 
the lectureship was taken over by the Australian National University, and 
the lectures delivered since that date have been given under the auspices of 
the University. 
The following lectures have !Jeen delivered: 
Inaugural: W.P. Chen, The Objects of the Foundation of the Lectureship 
and a review of Dr Morrison's Life in China. 10 May 1932. 
Second: W. Ah Ket, Eastern Thought, with More Particular Reference to 
Confucius. 3 May 1933. 
Third: J.S. MacDonald, The History and Development of Chinese Art. 3 May 
1934. 
Fourth: W~. Qlla, The New Culture Movement in China. 10 May 1935. 
Fifth: Wu lien-teh, Reminiscences of George E. Morrison; and Chinese 
Abroad. 2 September 1936. 
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Sixth: Chun-jien Pae, China Today: With Special Reference to Higher 
Education. 4 May 1937. 
Seventh: A.F. Barker, The Impact of Western Industrialism on China. 
17 May 1938. 
Eighth: S.H. Roberts, The Gifts of the Old China to the New. 5 June 1939. 
Ninth: Howard Mowll, West China as Seen Through the Eyes of the 
Westerner. 29 May 1949. 
Tenth: W.G. Goddard, The Ming Shen. A Study in Chinese Democracy. 
5 June 1941. 
Eleventh: D.B. Copland, The Chinese Social Structure. 27 September 1948.* 
Twelfth: J.K. Rideout, Politics in Medieval China. 28 October 1949. 
Thirteenth: C.P. FitzGerald, The Revolutionary Tradition in China. 19 March 
1951. 
Fourteenth: H.V. Evatt, Some Aspects of Morrison's Life and Work. 4 
December 1952. 
Fifteenth: Lord Lindsay of Birker, China and the West. 20 October 1953. 
Sixteenth: M. Titiev, Chinese Elements in Japanese Culture. 27 July 1954. 
Seventeenth: H. Bielenstein, Emperor Kuang-Wu (A.D.25-27) and the 
Northern Barbarians. 2 November 1955.* 
Eighteenth: Leonard B. Cox, The Buddhist Temples of Yun-Kang and Lung-
Men. 17 October 1956. • 
Nineteenth: Otto P.N. Berkelbach van der Sprenkel, The Chinese Civil 
Service. 4 November 1957. 
Twentieth: A.R. Davies, The Narrow Lane: Some Observations on the 
Recluse in Traditional Chinese Society. 19 November 1958. 
Twenty-first: C.N. Spinks, The Khmer Temple of Prah Vihar. 6 October 
1959.* 
Twenty-second: Chen Chih-rnai, Chinese Landscape Painting: The Golden 
Age. 5 October 1960. • 
Twenty-third: L. Carrington Goodrich, China's Contacts with Other Parts 
· of Asia in Ancient Times. 1 August 1961.* 
Twenty-fourth: N.G.D. Malrnqvist, Problems and Methods in Chinese 
Linguistics. 22 November 1962. • 
Twenty-fifth: H.F. Simon, Some Motivations of Chinese Foreign Policy. 
3 October 1963. 
Twenty-sixth: Wang Ung, Calendar, Cannon and Clock in the Cultural 
Relations between Europe and China. 18 November 1964. 
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Twenty-seventh: A.M. Halpern, Chinese ForeignPolicy-Successor Failure? 
9 August 1966. • 
Twenty-eighth: J.W. de Jong, Buddha's Word in China. 18 October 1967.* 
Twenty-ninth: J.D. Frodsham, New Perspectives in Chinese Literature. 23 
July 1968.• 
Thirtieth: E.A. Huck, The Assimilation of the Chinese in Australia. 6 
November 1969. • 
Thirty-first: K.A. Wittfogel, Agriculture: A Key to the Understanding of 
Chinese Society, Past and Present. 6 April 1970.* 
Thirty-second: I. de Rachewiltz, Prester John and Europe's Discovery of 
East Asia. 3 November 1971.* 
Thirty-third: Eugene Kamenka, Marx, Marxism and China. 6 September 
1972. 
Thirty-fourth: Liu Ts'un-yan, On the Art of Ruling a Big Country: Views of 
Three Chinese Emperors. 13 November 1973.* 
Thirty-fifth: Jerome Ch'en, Peasant Activism in Contemporary China. 22 
July 1974. 
Thirty-sixth: Yi-fu Tuan, Chinese Attitudes to Nature: Idea and Reality. 
3 September 1975. 
Thirty-seventh: Lo Hui-Min, The Tradition and Prototypes of the 
China-Watcher. 21October1976.* 
Thirty-eighth: Roy Hofheinz, People, Places and Politics in Modem China. 
17 August 1977. 
Thirty-ninth: Mark Elvin, Self-Liberation and Self-Immolation in Modem 
Chinese Thought, 13 September 1978.* 
* Available from Director's Office, Research School of Pacific Studies. 
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